1# network manager 2type netd, domain, mlstrustedsubject; 3type netd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type; 4 5net_domain(netd) 6# in addition to ioctls allowlisted for all domains, grant netd priv_sock_ioctls. 7allowxperm netd self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls; 8 9r_dir_file(netd, cgroup) 10 11allow netd system_server:fd use; 12 13allow netd self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw kill }; 14# Note: fsetid is deliberately not included above. fsetid checks are 15# triggered by chmod on a directory or file owned by a group other 16# than one of the groups assigned to the current process to see if 17# the setgid bit should be cleared, regardless of whether the setgid 18# bit was even set. We do not appear to truly need this capability 19# for netd to operate. 20dontaudit netd self:global_capability_class_set fsetid; 21 22# Allow netd to open /dev/tun, set it up and pass it to clatd 23allow netd tun_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; 24allowxperm netd tun_device:chr_file ioctl { TUNGETIFF TUNSETIFF }; 25allow netd self:tun_socket create; 26 27allow netd self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl; 28allow netd self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write; 29allow netd self:netlink_nflog_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl; 30allow netd self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl; 31allow netd self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_read nlmsg_write }; 32allow netd self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl; 33allow netd self:netlink_netfilter_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl; 34allow netd shell_exec:file rx_file_perms; 35allow netd system_file:file x_file_perms; 36not_full_treble(`allow netd vendor_file:file x_file_perms;') 37allow netd devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms; 38 39# Acquire advisory lock on /system/etc/xtables.lock 40allow netd system_file:file lock; 41 42# Allow netd to write to qtaguid ctrl file. 43# TODO: Add proper rules to prevent other process to access qtaguid_proc file 44# after migration complete 45allow netd proc_qtaguid_ctrl:file rw_file_perms; 46# Allow netd to read /dev/qtaguid. This is the same privilege level that normal apps have. 47allow netd qtaguid_device:chr_file r_file_perms; 48 49r_dir_file(netd, proc_net_type) 50# For /proc/sys/net/ipv[46]/route/flush. 51allow netd proc_net_type:file rw_file_perms; 52 53# Enables PppController and interface enumeration (among others) 54allow netd sysfs:dir r_dir_perms; 55r_dir_file(netd, sysfs_net) 56 57# Allows setting interface MTU 58allow netd sysfs_net:file w_file_perms; 59 60# TODO: added to match above sysfs rule. Remove me? 61allow netd sysfs_usb:file write; 62 63r_dir_file(netd, cgroup_bpf) 64 65allow netd fs_bpf:dir search; 66allow netd fs_bpf:file { read write setattr }; 67 68# TODO: netd previously thought it needed these permissions to do WiFi related 69# work. However, after all the WiFi stuff is gone, we still need them. 70# Why? 71allow netd self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search chown }; 72 73# Needed to update /data/misc/net/rt_tables 74allow netd net_data_file:file create_file_perms; 75allow netd net_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms; 76allow netd self:global_capability_class_set fowner; 77 78# Needed to lock the iptables lock. 79allow netd system_file:file lock; 80 81# Allow netd to spawn dnsmasq in it's own domain 82allow netd dnsmasq:process signal; 83 84# Allow netd to start clatd in its own domain 85allow netd clatd:process signal; 86 87set_prop(netd, ctl_mdnsd_prop) 88set_prop(netd, netd_stable_secret_prop) 89 90# Allow netd to publish a binder service and make binder calls. 91binder_use(netd) 92add_service(netd, netd_service) 93add_service(netd, dnsresolver_service) 94allow netd dumpstate:fifo_file { getattr write }; 95 96# Allow netd to call into the system server so it can check permissions. 97allow netd system_server:binder call; 98allow netd permission_service:service_manager find; 99 100# Allow netd to talk to the framework service which collects netd events. 101allow netd netd_listener_service:service_manager find; 102 103# Allow netd to operate on sockets that are passed to it. 104allow netd netdomain:{ 105 icmp_socket 106 tcp_socket 107 udp_socket 108 rawip_socket 109 tun_socket 110} { read write getattr setattr getopt setopt }; 111allow netd netdomain:fd use; 112 113# give netd permission to read and write netlink xfrm 114allow netd self:netlink_xfrm_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_write nlmsg_read }; 115 116# Allow netd to register as hal server. 117add_hwservice(netd, system_net_netd_hwservice) 118hwbinder_use(netd) 119get_prop(netd, hwservicemanager_prop) 120get_prop(netd, device_config_netd_native_prop) 121 122### 123### Neverallow rules 124### 125### netd should NEVER do any of this 126 127# Block device access. 128neverallow netd dev_type:blk_file { read write }; 129 130# ptrace any other app 131neverallow netd { domain }:process ptrace; 132 133# Write to /system. 134neverallow netd system_file:dir_file_class_set write; 135 136# Write to files in /data/data or system files on /data 137neverallow netd { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_data_file }:dir_file_class_set write; 138 139# only system_server, dumpstate and network stack app may find netd service 140neverallow { 141 domain 142 -system_server 143 -dumpstate 144 -network_stack 145 -netd 146 -netutils_wrapper 147} netd_service:service_manager find; 148 149# only system_server, dumpstate and network stack app may find dnsresolver service 150neverallow { 151 domain 152 -system_server 153 -dumpstate 154 -network_stack 155 -netd 156 -netutils_wrapper 157} dnsresolver_service:service_manager find; 158 159# apps may not interact with netd over binder. 160neverallow { appdomain -network_stack } netd:binder call; 161neverallow netd { appdomain -network_stack userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:binder call; 162 163# persist.netd.stable_secret contains RFC 7217 secret key which should never be 164# leaked to other processes. Make sure it never leaks. 165neverallow { domain -netd -init -dumpstate } netd_stable_secret_prop:file r_file_perms; 166 167# We want to ensure that no other process ever tries tampering with persist.netd.stable_secret, 168# the RFC 7217 secret key managed by netd. Doing so could compromise user privacy. 169neverallow { domain -netd -init } netd_stable_secret_prop:property_service set; 170 171# If an already existing file is opened with O_CREATE, the kernel might generate 172# a false report of a create denial. Silence these denials and make sure that 173# inappropriate permissions are not granted. 174neverallow netd proc_net:dir no_w_dir_perms; 175dontaudit netd proc_net:dir write; 176 177neverallow netd sysfs_net:dir no_w_dir_perms; 178dontaudit netd sysfs_net:dir write; 179